summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat
-rw-r--r--lib/mac.h4
-rw-r--r--lib/string.h10
-rw-r--r--nest/password.c15
-rw-r--r--nest/password.h2
-rw-r--r--proto/rip/config.Y22
-rw-r--r--proto/rip/packets.c72
-rw-r--r--proto/rip/rip.c7
-rw-r--r--proto/rip/rip.h2
8 files changed, 100 insertions, 34 deletions
diff --git a/lib/mac.h b/lib/mac.h
index 9dba8f89..5fc216fd 100644
--- a/lib/mac.h
+++ b/lib/mac.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#define ALG_SHA256 0x04
#define ALG_SHA384 0x05
#define ALG_SHA512 0x06
+#define ALG_HMAC 0x10
#define ALG_HMAC_MD5 0x11
#define ALG_HMAC_SHA1 0x12
#define ALG_HMAC_SHA224 0x13
@@ -34,6 +35,9 @@
#define HASH_STORAGE sizeof(struct sha512_context)
#define MAC_STORAGE sizeof(struct hmac_context)
+/* This value is used by several IETF protocols for padding */
+#define HMAC_MAGIC htonl(0x878FE1F3)
+
/* Generic context used by hash functions */
struct hash_context
{
diff --git a/lib/string.h b/lib/string.h
index bf0b7cb0..75cb88dd 100644
--- a/lib/string.h
+++ b/lib/string.h
@@ -39,6 +39,16 @@ xstrdup(const char *c)
return z;
}
+static inline void
+memset32(void *D, u32 val, uint n)
+{
+ u32 *dst = D;
+ uint i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+ dst[i] = val;
+}
+
#define ROUTER_ID_64_LENGTH 23
#endif
diff --git a/nest/password.c b/nest/password.c
index d6e2087f..e4813741 100644
--- a/nest/password.c
+++ b/nest/password.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include "nest/bird.h"
#include "nest/password.h"
#include "lib/string.h"
+#include "lib/mac.h"
struct password_item *last_password_item = NULL;
@@ -66,3 +67,17 @@ password_find_by_value(list *l, char *pass, uint size)
return NULL;
}
+uint
+max_mac_length(list *l)
+{
+ struct password_item *pi;
+ uint val = 0;
+
+ if (!l)
+ return 0;
+
+ WALK_LIST(pi, *l)
+ val = MAX(val, mac_type_length(pi->alg));
+
+ return val;
+}
diff --git a/nest/password.h b/nest/password.h
index 7392389b..f21483c4 100644
--- a/nest/password.h
+++ b/nest/password.h
@@ -34,4 +34,6 @@ static inline int password_verify(struct password_item *p1, char *p2, uint size)
return !memcmp(buf, p2, size);
}
+uint max_mac_length(list *l);
+
#endif
diff --git a/proto/rip/config.Y b/proto/rip/config.Y
index e15599e0..4ec45c7a 100644
--- a/proto/rip/config.Y
+++ b/proto/rip/config.Y
@@ -98,15 +98,29 @@ rip_iface_start:
rip_iface_finish:
{
+ /* Default mode is broadcast for RIPv1, multicast for RIPv2 and RIPng */
+ if (!RIP_IFACE->mode)
+ RIP_IFACE->mode = (rip_cfg_is_v2() && (RIP_IFACE->version == RIP_V1)) ?
+ RIP_IM_BROADCAST : RIP_IM_MULTICAST;
+
RIP_IFACE->passwords = get_passwords();
if (!RIP_IFACE->auth_type != !RIP_IFACE->passwords)
log(L_WARN "Authentication and password options should be used together");
- /* Default mode is broadcast for RIPv1, multicast for RIPv2 and RIPng */
- if (!RIP_IFACE->mode)
- RIP_IFACE->mode = (rip_cfg_is_v2() && (RIP_IFACE->version == RIP_V1)) ?
- RIP_IM_BROADCAST : RIP_IM_MULTICAST;
+ if (RIP_IFACE->passwords)
+ {
+ struct password_item *pass;
+ WALK_LIST(pass, *RIP_IFACE->passwords)
+ {
+ if (pass->alg && (RIP_IFACE->auth_type != RIP_AUTH_CRYPTO))
+ cf_error("Password algorithm option requires cryptographic authentication");
+
+ /* Set default crypto algorithm (MD5) */
+ if (!pass->alg && (RIP_IFACE->auth_type == RIP_AUTH_CRYPTO))
+ pass->alg = ALG_MD5;
+ }
+ }
RIP_CFG->min_timeout_time = MIN_(RIP_CFG->min_timeout_time, RIP_IFACE->timeout_time);
RIP_CFG->max_garbage_time = MAX_(RIP_CFG->max_garbage_time, RIP_IFACE->garbage_time);
diff --git a/proto/rip/packets.c b/proto/rip/packets.c
index 381b4771..468927e6 100644
--- a/proto/rip/packets.c
+++ b/proto/rip/packets.c
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@
*/
#include "rip.h"
-#include "lib/md5.h"
#include "lib/mac.h"
@@ -18,9 +17,7 @@
#define RIP_CMD_RESPONSE 2 /* responding to request */
#define RIP_BLOCK_LENGTH 20
-
#define RIP_PASSWD_LENGTH 16
-#define RIP_MD5_LENGTH 16
#define RIP_AF_IPV4 2
#define RIP_AF_AUTH 0xffff
@@ -73,7 +70,7 @@ struct rip_auth_tail
{
u16 must_be_ffff;
u16 must_be_0001;
- byte auth_data[];
+ byte auth_data[0];
};
/* Internal representation of RTE block data */
@@ -221,16 +218,24 @@ rip_fill_authentication(struct rip_proto *p, struct rip_iface *ifa, struct rip_p
auth->auth_type = htons(RIP_AUTH_CRYPTO);
auth->packet_len = htons(*plen);
auth->key_id = pass->id;
- auth->auth_len = sizeof(struct rip_auth_tail) + RIP_MD5_LENGTH;
+ auth->auth_len = mac_type_length(pass->alg);
auth->seq_num = ifa->csn_ready ? htonl(ifa->csn) : 0;
auth->unused1 = 0;
auth->unused2 = 0;
ifa->csn_ready = 1;
+ if (pass->alg < ALG_HMAC)
+ auth->auth_len += sizeof(struct rip_auth_tail);
+
/*
* Note that RFC 4822 is unclear whether auth_len should cover whole
* authentication trailer or just auth_data length.
*
+ * FIXME: We should use just auth_data length by default. Currently we put
+ * the whole auth trailer length in keyed hash case to keep old behavior,
+ * but we put just auth_data length in the new HMAC case. Note that Quagga
+ * has config option for this.
+ *
* Crypto sequence numbers are increased by sender in rip_update_csn().
* First CSN should be zero, this is handled by csn_ready.
*/
@@ -238,14 +243,18 @@ rip_fill_authentication(struct rip_proto *p, struct rip_iface *ifa, struct rip_p
struct rip_auth_tail *tail = (void *) ((byte *) pkt + *plen);
tail->must_be_ffff = htons(0xffff);
tail->must_be_0001 = htons(0x0001);
- strncpy(tail->auth_data, pass->password, RIP_MD5_LENGTH);
- *plen += sizeof(struct rip_auth_tail) + RIP_MD5_LENGTH;
+ uint auth_len = mac_type_length(pass->alg);
+ *plen += sizeof(struct rip_auth_tail) + auth_len;
- struct hash_context ctx;
- md5_init(&ctx);
- md5_update(&ctx, (byte *) pkt, *plen);
- memcpy(tail->auth_data, md5_final(&ctx), RIP_MD5_LENGTH);
+ /* Append key for keyed hash, append padding for HMAC (RFC 4822 2.5) */
+ if (pass->alg < ALG_HMAC)
+ strncpy(tail->auth_data, pass->password, auth_len);
+ else
+ memset32(tail->auth_data, HMAC_MAGIC, auth_len / 4);
+
+ mac_fill(pass->alg, pass->password, pass->length,
+ (byte *) pkt, *plen, tail->auth_data);
return;
default:
@@ -288,13 +297,25 @@ rip_check_authentication(struct rip_proto *p, struct rip_iface *ifa, struct rip_
DROP("no suitable password found", auth->key_id);
uint data_len = ntohs(auth->packet_len);
- uint auth_len = sizeof(struct rip_auth_tail) + RIP_MD5_LENGTH;
+ uint auth_len = mac_type_length(pass->alg);
+ uint auth_len2 = sizeof(struct rip_auth_tail) + auth_len;
- if (data_len + auth_len != *plen)
- DROP("packet length mismatch", data_len);
+ /*
+ * Ideally, first check should be check for internal consistency:
+ * (data_len + sizeof(struct rip_auth_tail) + auth->auth_len) != *plen
+ *
+ * Second one should check expected code length:
+ * auth->auth_len != auth_len
+ *
+ * But as auth->auth_len has two interpretations, we simplify this
+ */
- if ((auth->auth_len != RIP_MD5_LENGTH) && (auth->auth_len != auth_len))
- DROP("authentication data length mismatch", auth->auth_len);
+ if (data_len + auth_len2 != *plen)
+ DROP("packet length mismatch", *plen);
+
+ /* Warning: two interpretations of auth_len field */
+ if ((auth->auth_len != auth_len) && (auth->auth_len != auth_len2))
+ DROP("wrong authentication length", auth->auth_len);
struct rip_auth_tail *tail = (void *) ((byte *) pkt + data_len);
if ((tail->must_be_ffff != htons(0xffff)) || (tail->must_be_0001 != htons(0x0001)))
@@ -312,17 +333,18 @@ rip_check_authentication(struct rip_proto *p, struct rip_iface *ifa, struct rip_
return 0;
}
- char received[RIP_MD5_LENGTH];
- memcpy(received, tail->auth_data, RIP_MD5_LENGTH);
- strncpy(tail->auth_data, pass->password, RIP_MD5_LENGTH);
+ byte *auth_data = alloca(auth_len);
+ memcpy(auth_data, tail->auth_data, auth_len);
- struct hash_context ctx;
- md5_init(&ctx);
- md5_update(&ctx, (byte *) pkt, *plen);
- char *computed = md5_final(&ctx);
+ /* Append key for keyed hash, append padding for HMAC (RFC 4822 2.5) */
+ if (pass->alg < ALG_HMAC)
+ strncpy(tail->auth_data, pass->password, auth_len);
+ else
+ memset32(tail->auth_data, HMAC_MAGIC, auth_len / 4);
- if (memcmp(received, computed, RIP_MD5_LENGTH))
- DROP("wrong MD5 digest", pass->id);
+ if (!mac_verify(pass->alg, pass->password, pass->length,
+ (byte *) pkt, *plen, auth_data))
+ DROP("wrong authentication code", pass->id);
*plen = data_len;
n->csn = rcv_csn;
diff --git a/proto/rip/rip.c b/proto/rip/rip.c
index 37cfa9ac..7b380097 100644
--- a/proto/rip/rip.c
+++ b/proto/rip/rip.c
@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ rip_iface_update_buffers(struct rip_iface *ifa)
ifa->tx_plen = tbsize - headers;
if (ifa->cf->auth_type == RIP_AUTH_CRYPTO)
- ifa->tx_plen -= RIP_AUTH_TAIL_LENGTH;
+ ifa->tx_plen -= RIP_AUTH_TAIL_LENGTH + max_mac_length(ifa->cf->passwords);
}
static inline void
@@ -702,12 +702,11 @@ rip_reconfigure_iface(struct rip_proto *p, struct rip_iface *ifa, struct rip_ifa
ifa->cf = new;
+ rip_iface_update_buffers(ifa);
+
if (ifa->next_regular > (now + new->update_time))
ifa->next_regular = now + (random() % new->update_time) + 1;
- if ((new->tx_length != old->tx_length) || (new->rx_buffer != old->rx_buffer))
- rip_iface_update_buffers(ifa);
-
if (new->check_link != old->check_link)
rip_iface_update_state(ifa);
diff --git a/proto/rip/rip.h b/proto/rip/rip.h
index f245e612..b24d9536 100644
--- a/proto/rip/rip.h
+++ b/proto/rip/rip.h
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
#define RIP_NG_PORT 521 /* RIPng */
#define RIP_MAX_PKT_LENGTH 532 /* 512 + IP4_HEADER_LENGTH */
-#define RIP_AUTH_TAIL_LENGTH 20 /* 4 + MD5 length */
+#define RIP_AUTH_TAIL_LENGTH 4 /* Without auth_data */
#define RIP_DEFAULT_ECMP_LIMIT 16
#define RIP_DEFAULT_INFINITY 16
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-25 21:36:17 +0000